Counting to ten : testing the effect of delay on behaviour induced by emotion by Brandanger, Sigurd
 Master thesis for the Master of Economic Theory and Econometrics degree 
Counting to ten 
Testing the effects of delay on behaviour induced by emotion 
Sigurd Brandanger 
 
 
 
04.05.2007 
Department of Economics 
University of Oslo 
i 
 
  
Preface 
After almost two months of tedious programming it was quite a relief on Tuesday, March 27, 
2007, to finally see real people participating in my experiment. That they also seemed to 
behave “according to plan” (or, more precisely, according to my hypothesis), made the last 
month of writing this thesis more or less a walk in the park. As it turns out, “counting to ten” 
does indeed seem to prevent “hot-headed” decisions if you are experiencing negative 
emotions. This may not come as a surprise for any given reader, but I dare say it is an 
interesting result in terms of economics. 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Kjell Arne Brekke at the Frisch Centre for giving me the 
opportunity to write this thesis and his great aid in my doing so, and not least for waking my 
interest in behavioural economics in the first place. Furthermore, I would like to thank 
research fellow at the department of economics, Karen Evelyn Hauge, and fellow graduate 
student Brigt Erland Nersveen for their cooperation at Oslo Econlab, along with the 
participants of my two experiment sessions. Without their effort this thesis would not have 
been finished in due time. I would also like to thank the Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic 
Research for their financial support, which made me able to pay my participants actual 
money, and of course Oslo Econlab for letting me use their brand new economics laboratory 
in my “testing on humans”.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their interest and support during my time as an 
economics student and during my writing of this thesis. I hope this final product will bring 
some clarity to what I have been talking about for the past five months. And last, but not 
least, thanks are in order to Camilla Kristiansen for her proof-reading and last-minute 
comments. 
 
 
 
Sigurd Brandanger 
Oslo, May 2007 
ii 
 
  
Table of contents 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Background ...................................................................................................................... 3 
3. The ultimatum game ......................................................................................................... 5 
4. The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model ................................................................................ 7 
5. The Experiment .............................................................................................................. 10 
5.1 Experiment components .......................................................................................... 11 
5.1.1 The ultimatum game ......................................................................................... 13 
5.1.2 The Keynesian Beauty Contest ........................................................................ 14 
5.2 Experiment programming ........................................................................................ 15 
5.2.1 Experiment layout ............................................................................................ 16 
6. Experimental data ........................................................................................................... 23 
6.1 The ultimatum game ................................................................................................ 23 
6.2 The Keynesian Beauty Contest ................................................................................ 26 
7. Data Analysis ................................................................................................................. 29 
8. Comments ....................................................................................................................... 32 
9. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 35 
References/Literature ............................................................................................................. 37 
Appendix A. Experiment documents ..................................................................................... 38 
A.1 Invitation ...................................................................................................................... 39 
A.2 Rules ............................................................................................................................ 41 
A.3 Test session instructions .............................................................................................. 42 
A.4 Control session instructions ......................................................................................... 44 
A.5 Information sheets ....................................................................................................... 46 
A.6 Payment form .............................................................................................................. 50 
A.7 Payment lists (randomized to ensure anonymity)........................................................ 51 
Appendix B. The treatments ................................................................................................... 52 
Appendix C. Figure: Results from the Keynesian Beauty Contest ........................................ 59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
  
1. Introduction 
In economics, people are often assumed to maximize their expected utility when making 
choices. That is, an agent is assumed to always choose the option he expects will yield the 
highest utility for himself – there is little room left for unselfish behaviour. Money is one of 
the main factors contributing to utility, as it is used to buy goods and services. More money 
gives an agent higher utility than less money since it increases his budget constraint, and an 
agent is assumed not to be willing to part with his money unless in exchange for some good or 
service which provides utility. Leisure is another main factor contributing to utility, as it 
provides time to consume and enjoy the goods and services purchased with the money. In the 
following, I will disregard leisure and in my exposition equalize “utility maximizing” with 
“income maximizing” since the income/leisure trade-off is not the main concern in this thesis. 
Following the opening sentence, this means that economic agents often are assumed to 
maximize their income. Unfortunately for economists, this seems in many settings to be the 
exception rather than the rule. For example, it is not rational
1
 for an income maximizing 
person to give anything to charity: not to the Red Cross nor to the local beggar. Some of these 
settings are those where agents interact in a cooperating or bargaining situation, which are 
stylized in what we know as e.g. the ultimatum game (to be explained in detail in chapters 3 
and 5 – the main focus in this thesis is on players’ behaviour in the ultimatum game), public 
good games, and the dictator game. In all these games agents tend not to maximize their 
individual income as predicted by standard economic theory: in the ultimatum game it is not 
rational to turn down any positive offer, in a public good game it is usually not rational to 
contribute to the public good at all, and in the dictator game it is not rational to offer any 
positive amount. Still, the players in these games usually do exactly these things.  
 
Several augmentations of the theory have been presented in order to explain the practice, and 
many of them seem to fit well in different settings. Andreoni (1990) introduces the term 
“warm glow” as the explanatory factor of unselfish behaviour in which giving (or in 
                                                 
1
 Here and in the following, “rationality” is used in the strict, income maximizing sense of the word, meaning 
that it is only rational to take actions which maximize your income given your available options. For people who 
give to charity it is usually rational to do so, but that will be for other reasons than maximizing their own income 
since the option “give away money” obviously has a lower expected monetary value than the option “do not give 
away money”. 
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economic terms, reducing income), for example to charity, carries a value in itself. Sobel 
(2005) tries to explain this by introducing models of reciprocity in which agents are willing to 
reduce their income in order to reward (punish) other agents if they feel they have been 
treated well (badly). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) explain non-income maximizing behaviour by 
incorporating feelings of unfairness, or “inequity aversion”, into their model, which seems to 
explain the rejection of positive offers in ultimatum games well. I will use their model as a 
point of departure in this thesis where my main hypothesis is that inequity aversion as a 
consequence of unfair treatment is a feeling which does not prevail for a very long time. 
 
In this paper I will investigate, as a pre-test of an idea of my supervisor to see if the results are 
significant enough to pursue them with a larger project, whether a short delay preceding the 
decision process is sufficient to remove the above-mentioned inequity aversion. In order to do 
this I have conducted an experiment consisting of two sessions among students at the 
University of Oslo where a simple two-person ultimatum game was played. Incorporated in 
the test session was a three-minute delay between the players’ actions, i.e. the responders 
were “forced” to wait for three minutes before they made their decisions. In the control 
session this delay element was not introduced until after the responders’ decisions were made. 
The proposers in the ultimatum game could only choose between one fair and one unfair 
offer. The fair offer was a fifty-fifty split and the unfair offer was one where the proposer kept 
80 % of the amount to be divided. According to Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003, p. 177), 
one should expect that close to half of the unfair offers should be rejected by the responders 
when they know the alternative to be an even split. In my experiment the unfair offer was 
accepted by 73 % in the group where the responders experienced the delay, while the rate of 
acceptance was only 31 % in the control group, where there was no delay before the response. 
The results from the experiment show that my hypothesis is not only possible, but plausible. 
As results of a pre-test, they strongly suggest that they should be pursued by further research. 
 
In chapter 2 I present some background research for this thesis, in chapter 3 the ultimatum 
game, and the Fehr and Schmidt model (1999) is introduced in more detail in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 contains a description of the experiment and a presentation of the two games. 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical results from the experiment, and chapter 7 contains the data 
analysis. I comment on the results in chapter 8 before I sum it all up in chapter 9. 
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2. Background 
In an early wage/effort laboratory experiment Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) conclude 
that higher effort is induced by higher wages, contrary to the income-maximizing agent theory 
which predicts that workers will choose little or nothing above the required minimum amount 
of effort. This is explained by an understanding of fairness between employers and workers 
which ensures that employers can expect a higher effort by paying salaries above the market-
clearing level. However, Gneezy and List (2006) present the result of two gift-exchange field 
experiments, one on the effort of library workers and one on the effort of door-to-door 
fundraiser workers, where half of the workers are informed that they will receive a wage 
higher than the initially agreed upon level, i.e. they are given the “gift treatment”. Gneezy and 
List find that the effort of workers given this wage gift is significantly higher for only a short 
period and then sinks to the level of the workers in the “non-gift treatment” group.2 In their 
own words:  
 
“We report two major insights. First, consistent with findings in the experimental literature, a 
higher wage was reciprocated by greater effort on the part of the employees during the early 
hours of the task. Second, this higher effort level was not persistent: after a few hours, effort 
levels in the gift treatment mirrored those in the non-gift treatment.” 
 
 
One explanation suggested by Gneezy and List is that there are important behavioural 
differences between psychological processes in the short run and in the long run: the 
immediate reaction to an event dictated by what is called “hot” decision making is different 
than the decisions made in the “cold” phase entered a while later. In this case the workers 
given a higher wage exert a higher level of effort as long as they are in the hot phase, but this 
phase only lasts a few hours. It seems plausible that the reason for the hot phase is the positive 
feelings induced by the surprise of a higher than expected wage level, but as their results show 
these feelings seem to fade away rather fast, possibly because the workers get accustomed to 
their high wage level and so the euphoria of receiving more money diminishes. 
 
                                                 
2
 For the library workers, the effect of the gift was significantly higher (close to 25 %) the first 90 minutes, but 
after 270 minutes there was virtually no difference in effort (Gneezy & List (2006), p. 1371). For the fundraisers, 
the workers given the gift raised almost twice as much in the three hours before lunch but this difference had 
almost completely vanished in the three-hour period after lunch (p. 1375). 
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Elster (2006) suggests that emotions should be taken into account to a larger extent when 
creating economic models and explaining human behaviour in an economic setting. As he 
points out:  
 
“When people are under the influence of emotions, they often act in ways that they will regret 
later. (…) More often, though, emotion wanes like memory fades, by the sheer passage of time. 
Anger, shame, guilt and love rarely persist with the intensity they had at the onset of emotion.” 
 
This may very well help to explain the findings of Gneezy and List. This is also where we 
move closer to the crux of this thesis, namely that the non-income maximizing behaviour of 
agents in some settings can be explained through emotions experienced in the “hot” phase. As 
Elster suggests:  
 
“The preference for early action over delayed action may prevent the agent from gathering the 
amount of information that would have been optimal from a rational point of view.” 
 
In my experiment I will force this delay of actions upon the agents to see whether they will, in 
fact, change their behaviour to a more rational
3
 one. Since there is purely a matter of delay 
and no gathering of information in this experiment, I hope to find that the delay itself has an 
effect on the agents’ behaviour. 
 
In this paper, by accepting that feelings of unfairness matter in decision making, I will try to 
find out whether these feelings prevail or cool down over time. In order to do this, I conducted 
an experiment where the participants were either proposers or responders in an ultimatum 
game, and where half of the responders were set to solve a task before they were asked to 
make their decision. The other half served as a control group with no delay in the decision-
making process, i.e. the task was solved after their decision in the ultimatum game was made. 
                                                 
3
 Cf. footnote 1. 
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3. The ultimatum game 
The ultimatum game is a very simple game. One player, the proposer (P), is given the power 
to distribute an amount of money ( X ) between himself and the other player, the responder 
(R). The proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in which he will give the offered share 
( 1,0s ) of this amount to the responder, and the latter chooses whether to accept this offer. 
The game does not require any strategic thinking on the responder’s part, since all he has to 
do is to say “yes” or “no” to accepting an amount of money ( sX ) offered to him. If the 
responder accepts, he will receive the offered amount, and the proposer receives the 
remaining ( Xs)1( ). Should the responder reject the offer, neither player receives anything. 
Figure 3.1 shows the sequential presentation of the game. 
 
If the responder is income maximizing (i.e., he only cares about leaving the game with highest 
monetary payoff) he should accept any positive offer. If the proposer is also income 
maximizing and aware of the fact that the responder is, he should offer the lowest share 
possible since the responder is expected to accept any positive amount proposed to him. Fehr 
and Schmidt (2006) and Camerer (2003) present results from several experiments with this 
game, some with high monetary amounts to be distributed, and the typical share offered by 
the proposer lies between forty and fifty per cent, while offers below twenty per cent are often 
rejected. The latter result is a surprising one in terms of income maximizing theory
4
, and it 
                                                 
4
 The former result is not so surprising, since a rational, income-maximizing proposer may anticipate the 
rejection of a low offer and thus make a higher offer to ensure acceptance. 
 
Figure 3.2 The ultimatum game 
 
 
P 
R 
s 
),)1(( sXXs  
)0,0(  
Accept 
Reject 
1 
0 
 
Figure 3.1 The ultimatum game 
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tells us that agents do take other things besides money into consideration when making 
decisions. I.e., it falsifies the assumption that the players are income maximizers, or at least 
that the responder is. When a $2 offer of a $10 pie is rejected, the responder tells us that it is 
worth $2 to him to deny the proposer his $8 gain. This is often explained by some feeling of 
unfairness on the responder’s part, since he feels that an 80/20 split is unfair when the 
proposer may very well have offered $4 or even the “ultimately fair” 50/50 split. This 
willingness to pay in order to punish someone else is known as “negative reciprocity” and is 
probably a concept easily recognized by most people. 
 
The emotional perception of and reaction to unfairness in the ultimatum game and other 
games seems to be a relatively universal phenomenon, at least in the western world.
5
 
However, the time extent of the emotions triggering this reaction has not been taken into 
account earlier, and following Gneezy and List’s (2006) findings in the gift exchange game 
mentioned in chapter 2, I propose the hypothesis that negative feelings following an unfair 
offer fade within a relatively short amount of time, leading to a lower observed rejection rate 
of unfair offers if the time of the decision at hand is postponed. To test this hypothesis I ran an 
experiment where I implemented a delay in the ultimatum game played by one group (the test 
group) of responders, forcing them to take their mind off the offer about which they were to 
make a decision, and compared the rejection rates of the test group to the ones of the control 
group. 
 
                                                 
5
 Camerer (2003), pp. 68-74, presents some other results from different locations around the world. 
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4. The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model 
In their 1999 paper, Fehr and Schmidt present a model which explains the violation of the 
income maximizing principle by introducing inequity aversion as an explanatory factor. By 
doing so, they make the utility of an agent depend both on his own payoff and the difference 
between his own and the other agents’ payoffs. In a two-player setting, player i’s utility is 
given by 
 
0,max0,max)|(),( jiiijiiijijii xxxxxxxuxxu , 
2,1, ji , ji . 
 
Where i  is player i’s inequity aversion parameter when player i's payoff is lower than player 
j’s, and i  is player i’s inequity aversion parameter when his payoff is higher than player j’s. 
In either situation, a player’s utility given his own payoff is lower if the two players’ payoffs 
are not equal. Since inequality which is disadvantageous to player i is assumed to “hurt” more 
than inequality in player i's favour we have 0ii . Figure 4.1 illustrates agent i's utility 
 
ix  
)( iji xxu  
45° 
jx  
ix   
Figure 4.1 Utility with risk aversion 
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of agent j’s payoff, given his own payoff (figure adapted from Fehr and Schmidt (2006)). In 
other words: given that agent i receives payoff xi, his utility of this is a function of how much 
agent j receives. In the figure, i  is the absolute value of the slope to the right of the kink, 
while i  is the absolute value of the slope to the left of the kink. As shown in the figure, 
player i's maximum utility of player j’s payoff, )|( iji xxu , is reached when ji xx , and it is 
decreasing faster when ji xx  (below the 45-degree line) than when ji xx  (above the 45-
degree line). 
 
Using P and R as subscripts for the proposer and the responder, respectively, Rx  is the 
responder’s payoff if he accepts the offer of a share s  of the total amount X , so sXxR . Px  
is the proposer’s payoff if the offered share s  is accepted by the responder, so XsxP )1( . 
In the experiment the pie to be shared is NOK 100, so 100X  and we can thus calculate the 
responder’s alpha, R , if he is to reject the offer 201002.0sXxR . Assuming that the 
responder will accept any offer which yields positive utility, rejection of this offer implies that 
the responder’s utility is less than or equal to zero, further implying the alpha to be greater 
than or equal to one third: 
 
  
3/1
06020)80,20(
00,8020max0,2080max20)80,20(
R
RR
RRR
u
u
 
 
If a delay of time t changes rejection to acceptance, R  must change from 3/1R  to 
3/1tR , i.e. there is some “cooling factor” 
tc  which has an effect at time 0t  so that 
3/1R
tt
R c . In the experiment the timing is simply “before” and “after” the delay, 
which is when the players in the control group and the test group make their decisions, 
respectively. Normalising the duration of the delay to one, we get 1t  for the responders 
subjected to the delay while 0t  for the responders in the control group. Figure 4.2 
illustrates what happens. Without the delay, in point A, the responder’s utility of an 80/20 
split is less than zero and the offer is rejected. After the delay, in point B, R  is lower and the 
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utility curve to the right of the kink pivots upwards so his utility is now above zero and thus 
the offer is accepted since the ineqity aversion is reduced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45° 
20 80 
)8020(Pu  
)2080(Ru  
)( iji xxu  
jx
A 
B )2080(tRu  
 
Figure 4.2 Reducing the responder’s alpha 
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5. The Experiment 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, Experimental Economics 10(2), 171-178), and conducted in Oslo Econlab’s 
mobile computer laboratory with the client software z-Leaf running on the client PC’s and 
one experimenter PC running the server program z-Tree. This is, in fact, the first time z-Tree 
has been used in an economic experiment at the University of Oslo. The proposers and 
responders were randomly matched. The games were played in four rounds with different 
proposer/responder combinations, and the round which would determine the players’ payoffs 
was decided by lottery in advance. 
 
The experiment was conducted in two sessions on the morning of March 27, 2007 in room 
1220 at the department of economics, UiO. The test session was held at 9:00 a.m. and the 
control session at 2:00 p.m. All participants were given a show-up fee of NOK 50 in addition 
to whatever they would receive from the two games in the experiment. The groups consisted 
of bachelor and master students in arts and social sciences, and they were recruited by e-mail 
via student contacts at their respective departments. Originally I wanted only bachelor 
students and no students from economics or psychology since the ultimatum game is a fairly 
well-known game and students in the mentioned fields and master students may have some 
(correct or not) knowledge of how it works, which possibly could compromise the results. 
Due to low response to the invitations there were, however, both master students, economics 
students and psychology students amongst the participants in both sessions, but there were 
only two who were master students in economics and no master students in psychology.  
 
Also, during the reading of the instructions for the control group, one of the participants asked 
for a clarification concerning the outside payments of NOK 10 and NOK 50 for the proposer 
and the responder, respectively (presented in detail below). This question may have affected 
the answers in this group, as this information is given towards the end of the instructions 
where it was pointed out in the pilot experiment that it was difficult to observe (which was 
exactly the point). However, the effect (if any) of making this information clearer should have 
made the responders accept the unfair offers to a higher extent since they now knew that the 
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“real” choice was not between 50/50 and 80/20, but between 60/100 and 90/70. This 
information was deliberately made “easily overlookable” in the instructions in order to create 
a self-serving bias so the proposers would propose the unfair offer. The clarification was 
given to all of the participants in the control group, which could have made the responders 
more prone to accept the unfair behaviour of the proposers since they all now were made 
explicitly aware of the situation the proposers were in. However, looking at the results in 
retrospect, neither of these possible complications seem to have had any undesirable effect on 
the experiment results.  
5.1 Experiment components 
Since the object of this experiment is to test whether delay reduces the extent of which 
decisions are influenced by emotions, such an emotion needs to a large extent to be present 
amongst the responders. Therefore, I wanted as many of the proposers as possible in both 
groups to propose an unfair offer. By doing so, the responders would feel they were not being 
treated fairly, and I could investigate whether this feeling cooled down in the test group. I 
induced the unfair offers by giving the proposers only two options to choose their offer from: 
one even split (50/50: 5.0s ) and one “unfair” split, i.e. 80/20 ( 2.0s ). By using these as 
the only possible offers in the standard ultimatum game, a change on the responder’s part 
from rejection to acceptance if offered the unfair split by the introduction of delay can be 
interpreted as an indication of decreasing inequity aversion over time. In order to make the 
responders in the test group focus on something besides the offer they had been given and the 
response they were to give during the delay, they participated in a simple guessing game 
known as the Keynesian Beauty Contest presented below. The timing of the experiment is 
shown in table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Experiment timing 
Stage 1 2 3 4 
Test session Proposal - Beauty Contest Response 
Control session Proposal Response Beauty Contest - 
 
Whether the responders in the control group played the Beauty Contest should not have any 
effect on the results since their decisions already would have been made. However, they also 
played this game in order to make the experiment as similar as possible for the two groups. 
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My hypothesis is that the response would be different in the two groups, with a higher rate of 
acceptance in the test group. 
 
In order to take advantage of the self-serving bias
6
 mentioned in Babcock & Loewenstein 
(1997), outside payments were also used in the experiment. In addition to the payoff from the 
ultimatum game, the proposer received NOK 10 and the responder NOK 50 so that the even 
split yielded a total payoff combination of 60/100 and the unfair (80/20) offer yielded 90/70. 
Objectively, the latter should seem more fair than the former when considering total payoff, 
which is likely to make the proposer offer twenty, while the responder may still see the 80/20 
offer as unfair for two reasons. Firstly, if he does not pay attention to the outside payment 
when considering his decision, he observes only the unfair offer and fails to observe the 
objectively fairer 90/70. Secondly, even if the responder does take the total payoff into 
account when evaluating the offer, he may still consider the 90/70 split as less fair than the 
60/100 split since the latter is in the responder’s favour. Both these cases are examples of the 
phenomenon known as self-serving bias
7
. The specification with outside payments may 
induce a higher share of offers considered unfair, which is what I wanted to achieve in order 
to test my hypothesis. Therefore, I also made the outside payments explicitly known on-
screen to the proposers, while the responders were only told about this towards the end of the 
instructions. Table 5.2 presents the proposed and total payoffs if the offer is accepted. 
 
Table 5.2 Payoffs with outside payment 
Outside payment proposer/responder: 10/50 Proposer/responder split 
 50/50 
s = 0.5 
80/20 
s = 0.2 
Proposed payoff to proposer 
Proposed payoff to responder 
50 
50 
80 
20 
Total payoff to proposer 
Total payoff to responder 
50+10=60 
50+50=100 
80+10=90 
20+50=70 
 
                                                 
6
 Self-serving bias manifests itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way 
beneficial to their interests. (…) For instance, a student who gets a good grade on an exam might say, "I got an A 
because I am intelligent and I studied hard!" while a student who does poorly on an exam might say, "The 
teacher gave me an F because he does not like me!" (http://en.wikipedia.org) 
7
 Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein (1997) investigated this phenomenon in an experiment in which they 
set up a tort case based on a Texas traffic accident trial in which an injured motorcyclist sued the driver of the 
car that collided with him. As it turned out, there were large discrepancies between what the experiment 
participants, who were given the roles of plaintiffs and defendants, considered a fair settlement in all different 
specifications of the experiment. Apparently, self-serving bias is an inherent quality in most people, even when 
all means to ensure objectivity and “an open mind” are used. 
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It is clear that a proposer would prefer to receive a total of NOK 90 rather than NOK 60 both 
because the monetary value is larger and because a 90/70 division is fairer than 60/100. We 
can thus expect that a proposer with this information would choose to offer only NOK 20 to 
the responder.  
 
The experiment consisted of two parts: the ultimatum game which I used to test the effects of 
delay and the Keynesian Beauty Contest which was used as the delay element. In the control 
group the Beauty Contest was played after the responder had made a decision in the 
ultimatum game. 
 
5.1.1 The ultimatum game 
In the experiment, the ultimatum game takes on a slightly simpler form than described in 
chapter 3. The amount to be divided between the proposer and the responder is NOK 100. The 
proposer is in the experiment not free to choose the share s he wants to offer freely, but is 
restricted to choose either the fair choice of offering half, NOK 50, or offering the unfair 
amount of NOK 20 while keeping NOK 80 for himself. The responder’s role is still the same: 
accepting or rejecting the proposer’s offer. Figure 5.1 shows the sequential presentation of the 
game in the experiment where the responder in the final stage must choose between NOK 50 
and nothing or between NOK 20 and nothing. 
 
Accept 
Reject 
P 
R 
)50,50(  
)0,0(  
Accept 
Reject 
R 
)20,80(  
)0,0(  
5,0s  
2,0s  
 
Figure 5.1 The ultimatum game in the experiment 
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It is clear that a responder only caring about maximizing the monetary output of the game will 
choose to accept the offer over the alternative of receiving nothing in either case. Still, as I 
pointed out in chapter 3, empirical results show that this often is not the case. In the 
experiment I introduce a delay before the responder’s decision node and propose that this 
delay will make the responders experiencing it accept the unfair offer to a higher extent. 
5.1.2 The Keynesian Beauty Contest  
For the delay part of the experiment, The “Keynesian Beauty Contest” seemed appropriate. 
This is a simple guessing game in which deducing a solution usually requires quite a bit of 
thinking, which made it suitable for my purpose. It has been used to test the assumption of 
rational reasoning by economic agents and to illustrate problems of iteration of dominated 
strategies and the assumption of common knowledge of rationality. You can think of a seller 
in the stock market who wants to sell his shares just before the average seller is, i.e. just when 
the price of the share is at its peak. However, if he thinks that everybody thinks like him, he 
will anticipate that everybody will sell when they think the price is at its peak so he will sell a 
little bit earlier. If everyone does think like him, the selling time will unravel and in 
equilibrium everybody will sell immediately. The name is due to Keynes (1936) who 
compared a clever investor to a participant in a newspaper beauty contest where the aim was 
to guess the average preferred face among 100 photographs. 
 
The rules of the game are straightforward. Each person of N players is asked to choose a (real 
or integer) number from the interval 0 to 100. The winner is the person whose choice is 
closest to a share p times the mean of the choices of all players (where p is, for example, 2/3). 
There is a NOK 500 prize for the winner, and if there are several winners this amount will be 
divided between them. Time to think: three minutes. 
 
The challenge to the players of this game is to figure out how rational the other players will 
behave. The equilibrium solution is that all players choose zero if p is below one. Figure 5.2 
describes the process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies for p=2/3 if the 
number to be chosen is a real number. A rational player does not simply choose a random 
number or his favourite number, nor does he choose a number above 100p, since it is 
dominated by 100p. Moreover, if he believes that the others are rational as well, he will not 
pick a number above 100p
2
, and if he believes that the others are rational and that they also 
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believe that all are rational, he will not pick a number above 100p
3
 and so on, until all 
numbers except zero are eliminated. If the number of players is 2, 0 is a dominant strategy. 
There are no other equilibriums in the (in)finitely repeated game. If p>1 then the upper bound 
of the interval is also an equilibrium. For p=1 any number chosen by all players can be an 
equilibrium, with 50 as a natural focal point.  
 
Equilibrium          ITERATION          
... … E(4) E(3) E(2) E(1) E(0) 
0 13.17 19.75 29.63 44.44 66.66 100 
Figure 5.2 Infinite process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies for p=2/3. E(0) 
is the area of dominated choices, E(1) is the area of one iteration of elimination and so on. 
 
In contrast to the iterated elimination of dominated strategies, Figure 5.3 shows another 
process, the process of iterated best reply, which better explains actual behaviour. The 
elimination process does not start at 100 but instead at 50, because a player will, for 
insufficient reasoning, think that any number is equally likely; therefore the mean should be 
50. Thus the best reply is 2/3*50=33.33. If everybody thinks that way best reply should be 
22.22 and so on.  
Equilibrium       ITERATION  
  E(3) E(2) E(1)   
0  14.9 22.22 33.33 50 100 
Figure 5.3 Infinite process of iterated elimination of best replies, starting at 50 
 
In the experiment, since the game was to be repeated, there was a danger of the players 
learning the equilibrium and as a consequence would not think as hard during the delay 
towards the end of the experiment. In an attempt to avoid this, I varied the value of p and 
assigned to it values both below and above 1, making the equilibrium value (or focal point) 
change between rounds. 
 
In the experiment, the participants were instructed to choose an integer between 0 and 100. In 
this case, 1 is also an equilibrium if everyone else also chooses 1 and p>1/2.  
5.2 Experiment programming 
z-Tree is a part graphical, part text-based programming tool designed to make programming 
economic experiments (called treatments in z-Tree lingo) easier. The structure and timing of a 
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treatment are easily programmed and edited using the program’s graphical interface and “cut-
and-paste”, and the number of participants and groups can also be changed at will. However, 
creating a four-period ultimatum game experiment with an incorporated guessing game turned 
out to require quite an amount of work (the program in pure text format is a 25 page 
document, but due to z-Tree’s graphical tree structure the treatment in print requires only 
three pages). The most time-consuming and challenging parts of designing the experiment 
was the defining of variables and their interaction and the calculation of payoffs in the 
different parts of the treatment. In fact, the little detail of changing the share p in the guessing 
game between rounds showed itself to be more than just a little cumbersome. The 
programming itself, in addition to learning z-Tree from scratch, took close to two months 
from I started programming until the experiment was ready to use. The test- and control 
treatments in their final form consist of 14 and 13 stages, respectively, each stage gathering 
information from or giving information to the participants. Figure 5.4 shows the stages in the 
two treatments as collapsed trees, the only difference being the delay stage entering before the 
responder’s decision stage in the test treatment. Expanded, full-size versions of the trees are 
found in appendix B.  
 
Figure 5.4 Stages 
 
5.2.1 Experiment layout 
The following pages display how the first round of the experiment in the test session looked 
for two participants paired together in the ultimatum game. In this example, the two players 
are the only two participating in the guessing game, so the average number is simply the 
average of their two numbers. The top screenshots are those of the proposer, while the bottom 
screenshots are those of the responder.  
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6. Experimental data 
6.1 The ultimatum game 
The test session was conducted at 9:00 a.m. on March 27, 2007. It consisted of twelve 
participants assigned ID-numbers 1001-1012, each played the ultimatum and guessing game 
four times, giving a total of 24 data points for the ultimatum game. In each of the four periods 
the players were divided into two types, proposers being type 1 and responders being type 2. 
Table 6.1 presents the results from the test session. The “Offer”-column indicates the offer 
given by type 1 and observed by type 2. The “Accept”-column indicates whether the offer 
was accepted (1) or not (0). The unfair offers are lightly shaded. 
 
Table 6.1 Test session results. 
Period ID Type Offer Accept Period ID Type Offer Accept 
1 1001 1 50 1 3 1001 2 20 0 
1 1002 1 50 1 3 1002 2 50 1 
1 1003 1 20 1 3 1003 2 50 1 
1 1004 1 20 0 3 1004 2 20 1 
1 1005 1 50 1 3 1005 2 20 1 
1 1006 1 20 0 3 1006 2 50 1 
1 1007 2 50 1 3 1007 1 50 1 
1 1008 2 50 1 3 1008 1 20 1 
1 1009 2 20 1 3 1009 1 20 1 
1 1010 2 20 0 3 1010 1 50 1 
1 1011 2 50 1 3 1011 1 20 0 
1 1012 2 20 0 3 1012 1 50 1 
2 1001 1 20 1 4 1001 2 50 1 
2 1002 1 50 1 4 1002 2 50 1 
2 1003 1 20 1 4 1003 2 20 1 
2 1004 1 50 1 4 1004 2 20 1 
2 1005 1 50 1 4 1005 2 50 1 
2 1006 1 50 1 4 1006 2 20 1 
2 1007 2 50 1 4 1007 1 50 1 
2 1008 2 50 1 4 1008 1 20 1 
2 1009 2 20 1 4 1009 1 20 1 
2 1010 2 50 1 4 1010 1 50 1 
2 1011 2 20 1 4 1011 1 20 1 
2 1012 2 50 1 4 1012 1 50 1 
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There were made a total of 24 offers over the four rounds, eleven of which were the unfair 
NOK 20 offer. Of these eleven unfair offers, eight (72.7 %) were accepted by the responder. 
All of the fair offers in the test group were, as one should expect, accepted.  
 
The control session was conducted at 14:00 p.m. and consisted of fourteen participants 
assigned the ID-numbers 2001-2014. Table 6.2 presents the data from the control session. 
 
Table 6.2 Control session results 
Period ID Type Offer Accept Period ID Type Offer Accept 
1 2001 1 50 1 3 2001 2 20 1 
1 2002 1 20 0 3 2002 2 20 0 
1 2003 1 50 1 3 2003 2 20 0 
1 2004 1 20 0 3 2004 2 20 1 
1 2005 1 50 1 3 2005 2 20 0 
1 2006 1 50 1 3 2006 2 50 1 
1 2007 2 50 1 3 2007 1 20 0 
1 2008 2 20 0 3 2008 1 20 1 
1 2009 2 50 1 3 2009 1 20 0 
1 2010 2 20 0 3 2010 1 50 1 
1 2011 2 50 1 3 2011 1 20 1 
1 2012 2 50 1 3 2012 1 50 1 
1 2013 2 0 0 3 2013 2 50 1 
1 2014 2 0 0 3 2014 1 20 0 
2 2001 1 20 0 4 2001 2 50 1 
2 2002 1 50 1 4 2002 2 50 1 
2 2003 1 20 0 4 2003 2 50 1 
2 2004 1 20 0 4 2004 2 50 1 
2 2005 1 20 1 4 2005 2 20 0 
2 2006 1 20 1 4 2006 2 50 1 
2 2007 2 20 1 4 2007 1 50 1 
2 2008 2 50 1 4 2008 1 50 1 
2 2009 2 20 0 4 2009 1 50 1 
2 2010 2 50 1 4 2010 1 20 0 
2 2011 2 20 0 4 2011 1 50 1 
2 2012 2 20 0 4 2012 1 50 1 
2 2013 1 50 1 4 2013 2 50 1 
2 2014 2 20 1 4 2014 1 50 1 
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There were 27 offers made in the control session
8
 and thirteen of these were unfair. Of the 
unfair offers, only four (30.8 %) were accepted. All of the 50/50 offers were accepted in the 
control group as well.  
 
Table 6.3 presents the total results from the experiment, where the variable “Accept” carries 
the value 1 if the offer is accepted and 0 if rejected. The variable “Delay” carries the value 1 if 
a delay was present and 0 if it was not. The response observations for the unfair offers in the 
test session are numbered 1-11, while the response observations for the unfair offers in the 
control session are numbered 12-24. 
 
Table 6.3 Response observations for the unfair offers in both sessions 
Observation Accept Delay Observation Accept Delay 
1 1 1 12 0 0 
2 0 1 13 0 0 
3 0 1 14 0 0 
4 1 1 15 0 0 
5 1 1 16 0 0 
6 1 1 17 1 0 
7 1 1 18 1 0 
8 0 1 19 0 0 
9 1 1 20 1 0 
10 1 1 21 0 0 
11 1 1 22 1 0 
   23 0 0 
   24 0 0 
 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the main results, both for each round separately and for the experiment as a 
whole. The bars represent the acceptance rates of the unfair offer in the two groups. It is clear 
that the acceptance rate is higher in the test group, where eight of eleven, or 72.7 %, of the 
responders accepted the unfair offer, whereas only four of thirteen, or 30.8 %, of the 
responders in the control group accepted.  
 
                                                 
8
 There were only 27 and not 28 data points in session 2 due to an error in the experiment program making round 
one in the session run with six proposers and eight responders, making participants 2013 and 2014 responders 
without offers to respond to. This error was quickly resolved during the first round, making the last three rounds 
run with the correct number of proposers and responders. 
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Figure 6.1: acceptance rates of the unfair offer 
 
6.2 The Keynesian Beauty Contest 
Even though the results from the guessing game have no relevance for my thesis per se, since 
I am only interested in its function as a delay activity, I nevertheless find them interesting 
enough to report. As mentioned in chapter four, the Beauty Contest has been used to test how 
rational players of the game think the other players are. The main results from this kind of 
experiments elsewhere suggest that most people think two or three iterations ahead, so with p 
equal to two thirds, players are expected to choose a number somewhere between twenty and 
thirty (Nagel, 1999) . I have pooled the data from the two groups in table 6.4 in such a fashion 
that each row presents the choices of one player in all the four rounds. The results are 
somewhat surprising. 
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Table 6.4 Numbers guessed in the guessing game 
 Round 1, p = 2/3 Round 2, p = 1 Round 3, p = 1/2 Round 4, p = 2 
 32 64 40 40 
 11 27 17 78 
 20 37 19 47 
 32 24 20 42 
 19 33 19 87 
 34 43 21 37 
 13 13 13 35 
 34 51 6 100 
 34 34 19 50 
 15 52 23 100 
 42 24 99 28 
 23 57 11 84 
 28 35 18 80 
 12 40 20 100 
 22 42 13 50 
 25 33 15 80 
 57 43 6 100 
 13 26 17 99 
 27 43 47 27 
 17 44 26 100 
 37 33 17 100 
 59 47 17 13 
 40 40 21 5 
 31 31 31 31 
 45 51 8 100 
 67 26 21 48 
Average value 30.3 38.2 22.5 63.9 
Median 29.5 38.5 19 64 
Minimum value 11 13 6 5 
Maximum value 67 64 99 100 
Goal 20.2 38.2 11.2 127.8 
 
The average and median values of the data set are not so far from what one should expect, 
except for in round 4, where a higher average should be expected. A few points should be 
made: 
 In round 3, where p=1/2, the highest value is 99 and this player chose 28 in round 4. 
 In round 4, where p=2, twelve players chose values below 50, the lowest being 5. 
 Only seven players chose 100 in round 4. 
 One player chose 31 in all four rounds. 
 One player chose 13 in the three first rounds, and then chose 35. 
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These results show that the iteration process does not include many stages for some of the 
participants. The numbers 99 in round 3 and 5 in round 4 can even look like sabotage, but I 
will disregard this possibility. It seems like some players try to use their experiences from 
previous rounds when making their decisions, especially in round 4 where many have seen 
that they have over-shot the goal in the first three rounds and thus are careful in their choice in 
the final round. This may be the case for the player who guessed 5 in the final round, who 
guessed 40, 40 and 21 in the three preceding rounds and consistently overshot the goal. Of 
course, some players may also very well not have cared at all, but since there was a NOK 500 
prize for the winner, they should have put at least some effort in their decision-making. 
Unclear presentation of the rules may also be an explanation for the unusual results, but the 
players received information about the rules both before the experiment, on-screen while the 
guessing game was played and they were also given a sheet of paper with the goal before each 
round on which they could make notes so I dare say there was little that could be done in 
order to inform them better. 
 
Despite the above-mentioned irregularities most of the participants chose numbers according 
to previous results, except from the low numbers in round 4, as can be seen from the figure in 
appendix C. 
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7. Data Analysis 
In this chapter I will test the effects of delay on the decisions made in the experiment. 
Immediately, by looking at the data presented in table 3, there seems to be considerable 
correlation between the delay and the rejection rate. Since this has been a controlled 
experiment, I will use ordinary statistical methods to analyse the data. The goal is to find out 
whether the probability of a responder accepting an unfair offer is higher when the responder 
is subject to a delay before making his decision. 
 
The null hypothesis is that the probability of acceptance in the test group is lower than or 
equal to the probability in the control group, i.e. the observations are drawn from the same 
sample (this would strictly mean that the null hypothesis is that the two probabilities are the 
same, but as I completely disregard the possibility that the test group probability to be lower, I 
choose “less than or equal to” in order to have the alternative hypothesis “greater than”). Thus 
the observed differences are merely coincidental and we should expect that the “true” 
acceptance probability is better estimated by treating the two sessions as one. Rejecting the 
null hypothesis would strengthen my main hypothesis in this paper, namely that the 
probability of acceptance is larger in the test group. We thus have the hypotheses: 
 
  
CT
CT
ppH
ppH
:
:
1
0
 
 
The subscripts T,C,E indicates whether the variable in question belongs to the test session, the 
control session, or the entire experiment seen as a whole, respectively. Introducing jix  as a 
binary variable which takes on value 1 if an offer is accepted and 0 if rejected and also 
introducing 
iN
j jii
xX
1
, ECTi ,, , iNj ,...,1 , where iN  is the number of unfair offers 
in session i, we can start examining the data. Following the above description of the 
subscripts, we have CTE NNN  and CTE XXX .  
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Table 7.1 sums up the data properties for the null hypothesis. The first columns should be 
self-evident, following the above information. The estimated probability of an unfair offer 
being accepted is iii NXp /ˆ , i=T,C,E, with the estimate’s variance and standard deviation 
given in the last two columns by 
i
EE
E
N
pp
p
)1(
)ˆvar(  and )ˆvar()ˆ( EE ppSD , i=T,C,E, 
facilitating the pooled Epˆ  in the calculation of the moments since the observations are 
assumed to be drawn from the same sample. (Løvås (2003) p. 189). 
 
Table 7.1 Statistical properties 
Session,(i) 
iN  iX  iii NXp /ˆ  )ˆvar( Ep  )ˆ( EpSD  
Test (T) 11 8 0.727 0.023 0.151 
Control (C) 13 4 0.308 0.019 0.139 
Total (E) 24 12 0.5 0.010 0.102 
 
Assuming that the probabilities in question are normally distributed, we see by rewriting the 
null hypothesis to 0:0 CT ppH  that the difference between the two probabilities must 
follow the normal distribution with expectation zero (again, since the null hypothesis predicts 
pT=pC=pE) as a sum of two normally distributed variables. Interpreting the left-hand side of 
H0 as a new variable, we can calculate the following: 
 
  
205.0042.0)var()(
042.0019.0023.0)ˆvar()ˆvar()var(
419.0308.0727.0ˆˆ)(
CTCT
CTCT
CTCT
ppppSD
pppp
pppp
 
 
Testing H0 requires a one-sided normality test. At a 95 % confidence level, H0 is rejected if  
 
  645.1
)(
0)(
95.0z
ppSD
pp
CT
CT  
 
From the above calculations we thus get 
 
  645.1048.2
)(
)(
CT
CT
ppSD
pp
, 
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so the null hypothesis is rejected at the 95 % confidence level. In fact, we see that in order for 
H0 not to be rejected, we need 
   
  05.2
)( CT
CT
ppSD
pp
z . 
 
Looking up this z-value in a normal distribution table tells us that the null hypothesis will be 
rejected at the 98.0 % confidence level. This suggests strongly that there really is a higher 
propensity to accept an unfair offer if a delay is experienced. 
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8. Comments 
As shown in the previous chapter, there is strong evidence in the data that introducing a delay 
preceding a person’s decision in the ultimatum game has a positive effect on the probability 
that this person will accept an offer which can be perceived as unfair. Applying this 
knowledge to the discussion in chapter 3 tells us that the inequity aversion in Fehr and 
Schmidt’s model is highly transient and that the absolute value of the model’s alpha is 
reduced after only a short amount of time. 
 
Still, all is not crystal-bright just yet. In my experiment there were a total of only 26 
participants, constituting only six and seven proposer-responder pairs in the test and control 
sessions, respectively. Being as the game was repeated four times in both sessions, one can 
suspect that some learning might have biased the behaviour of the participants to some extent, 
bus this bias should be the same in both sessions, so there should be no bias in the results. 
However, due to restrictions on time and money, I chose to do it this way in order to collect 
enough data points. Another possible problem is the fact that some of the responders may 
have received the same offer in two consecutive rounds even though they played against 
different proposers and thus answered similarly in the two rounds. In that case, one could 
argue that the two points are then in reality only one. Controlling for this possibility in the 
data shows that this is a possibility for four of the accepted unfair offers in the test group and 
two of the rejected offers in the control group, invalidating two observations from the former 
and one from the latter. The consequences of this are that there are nine unfair offers in the 
test group, six of which are accepted, and twelve unfair offers in the control group, four of 
which are accepted. This gives the statistical properties in table 8.1, corresponding to table 7.1 
for the full data set. 
 
Table 8.1 Statistical properties 
Session,(i) 
iN  iX  iii NXp /ˆ  )ˆvar( Ep  )ˆ( EpSD  
Test (T) 9 6 0.67 0.028 0.166 
Control (C) 12 4 0.33 0.021 0.144 
Total (E) 21 10 0.48 0.012 0.109 
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 Doing the same statistical analysis as in chapter 7 gives a z-value of 1.51, indicating that the 
data now are significant only at the 93.5 % level. A later study should try to run eight separate 
sessions with the games only played once in each session in order to get a more reliable basis 
for the data. 
 
In spite of the possible shortcomings of repeated games, the data do not seem to display any 
learning with negative effects to the results of this experiment. The participants played their 
roles twice before they switched from proposer to responder and vice versa, so the basis for 
learning was not that large. The biggest “threat” for the credibility of the results is the fact that 
proposers were made explicitly aware of the outside payment of the responders before they 
made their offer, while the responders only got this information towards the end of the 
instructions before the experiment started. This was done to stimulate the proposers to 
propose the unfair offer. When the roles were switched after two rounds, the proposers may 
have taken notice of the fact that the responders did not get this information, and the 
responders may have taken notice of the fact that the proposers did. Still, this does not seem to 
have had a great effect. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show the number of offers and accepted unfair 
offers in each round and in total for the two sessions. In the test session there is only a small 
difference between the behaviour of the proposers in the two first rounds compared to the two 
last rounds. Also, the responders increased their acceptances of the unfair offer from round 1 
to round 2, and from round 3 to round 4. The latter finding may be explained by some 
learning effect. However, we see that in the control session the number of fair offers was 
reduced from 4 to 2 in the first two rounds, but increased from 2 to 6 in the last two. The latter 
change may be due to the fact that the proposers in the last two rounds were aware that the 
responders did not receive the outside payment. It is more likely, though, that this change 
came as a response to the low acceptance rate of the unfair offer in round 3.  
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Figure 8.1 Test session offers and unfair accepts. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Control session offers and unfair accepts. 
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9. Conclusion 
In this thesis my goal has been to test whether the negative feelings which arise from being 
treated unfairly linger on or fade quickly. My hypothesis has been that the feelings do, in fact, 
disappear rather fast, and to test this I conducted two experiment sessions where I tried to 
induce the proposers in an ultimatum game to behave in an unfair manner in order to test how 
the responders reacted to this. In the test session the responders experienced a three-minute 
delay before their decisions were made, and in the control session the decision was to be made 
immediately. The results show that 73 % (eight of eleven) of the responders who were given 
the unfair offer in the test group accepted this offer, whereas this share was only 31 % (four of 
thirteen) in the control group. By themselves these numbers clearly support my hypothesis, 
and the findings were also significant. However, the number of participants in the experiment 
was low due to a lack of response to the experiment invitations, so the experiment needs to be 
conducted with more participants in order to find more robust results. Also, the fact that the 
experiment was repeated four times in each session, making the participants sit on both sides 
of the ultimatum table twice, may have led to some learning bias in the data. This effect 
should be the same in both groups, though, so the difference in acceptance rates may still not 
have suffered all that much. In any case my findings suggest that continued research in this 
area should be considered. 
 
If it turns out that “counting to ten” has such a marked effect on negative (or, indeed, also 
positive) feelings and further on the behaviour of the individuals experiencing these feelings, 
the economic rationality and income-maximising assumptions suddenly do not seem as far-
fetched as they have been criticized for over the years. These kinds of assumptions do, 
however, need to take into account the fact that people often act “in the heat of passion” or “in 
the spur of the moment”, but all in all these findings indicate that people are inherently 
rational once they “get over” their feelings. So the question is: when are individuals in a 
setting where they act on behalf of their feelings, and when are they not? These findings also 
suggest that findings in other controlled experiments may lose some of their punch if 
decisions in the experiment need to be taken faster than in a “natural” setting. This all fits 
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nicely into the main points of Elster (2006), who strongly advocates the use of emotions as an 
explanatory factor in behavioural economics.  
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Appendix A. Experiment documents 
The only difference in the documents given the experiment participants was in their 
instructions. Apart from that, all participants in both groups were given an invitation via e-
mail, a sheet of rules, a payment form and an envelope addressed to the Frisch Centre’s 
accounting department. In this appendix is first the invitation e-mail, then the rules given the 
participants as they entered the laboratory. The first set of instructions is those for the test 
group, the second for the control group. After these you will find the rules and the “share p” 
information sheets which were handed out during the delay in each round. The final two 
pages of appendix A are the payment form and the payment lists which were sent to 
accounting. These documents are currently in Norwegian since the experiment was conducted 
in Norwegian only, but I will provide translations upon request if desired. 
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A.1 Invitation 
 
Invitasjon til å delta i økonomisk eksperiment ved Universitetet i Oslo.  
 
Du er herved invitert til å delta i et økonomisk eksperiment i regi av Økonomisk Institutt ved 
Universitetet i Oslo.  
 
Eksperimentet vil finne sted i SV-byggets 12.etasje i rom 1220, og vil vare i omlag en time. 
Som deltager vil du få en belønning i form av penger, minimum kr 50, ut ifra hvilke valg du 
og de andre deltagerne i eksperimentet tar. Eksperimentet vil foregå på datamaskiner, og du 
vil bli bedt om å foreta noen enkle økonomiske beslutninger. Ingen forkunnskaper er 
nødvendige.  
 
Det vil være 7 eksperimentpartier; tirsdag 27.mars kl 09:00, kl 14:00 og kl 16:00 og onsdag 
28.mars kl 09:00, kl 11:00, kl 13:00 og kl 15:00. Ingen kan delta på mer enn ett parti.  
 
Deltagelse i dette eksperimentet er frivillig. Dersom du ønsker å delta i eksperimentet, kan du 
sende en e-post til econ-lab@econ.uio.no for å registrere deg. E-posten må inneholde navn, e-
postadresse, telefonnummer og hvilket eksperimentparti du ønsker å delta på (oppgi gjerne et 
andrevalg i tilfelle partiet du ønsker å delta på allerede er fullt). Før du registrerer deg til 
eksperimentet, bør du lese reglene og retningslinjene for personvern som er gitt under. Din 
påmelding til eksperimentet er å anse som aksept av reglene og retningslinjene oppsummert i 
samtykkeerklæringen under.  
 
 
Med vennlig hilsen 
 
Geir Asheim   Karen E. Hauge Sigurd Brandanger  Brigt Erland Nersveen 
Professor   Stipendiat   Masterstudent  Masterstudent 
 
Økonomisk Institutt        
 
 
Regler og retningslinjer for personvern 
I dette eksperimentet vil det være 7 eksperimentpartier med mellom 16 og 24 deltagere i hvert 
parti. Kun de som har fått invitasjon til å delta på eksperimentet, og som har meldt seg på til et 
parti har rett til å delta. Hver person kan kun delta på ett parti.  
 
Til hvert parti rekrutterer vi noen flere enn nødvendig i tilfelle noen ikke skulle dukke opp. 
Dersom du møter opp i tide og partiet er fullt, vil du bli kompensert med kr 50.  
 
Det er frivillig å delta i dette eksperimentet. Du kan når som helst trekke deg fra å delta i 
eksperimentet uten å oppgi grunn, og ved skriftlig anmodning vil all informasjon om deg bli 
slettet. Hvis en deltager bestemmer seg for å forlate eksperimentet før det er slutt, vil han/hun 
kun få utbetalt kr 50. Hvis du melder deg på et parti, forventer vi at du møter opp. Dersom du 
ikke møter opp kan det hende at hele partiet må avlyses. Vi ber deg derfor sjekke tidspunktet 
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for partiet nøye før du melder deg på. Dersom du av en eller annen grunn ikke kan delta etter 
at du har meldt deg på et parti, ber vi deg sende en e-post minst 12 timer i forveien og melde 
avbud.  
 
Etter at alle partiene i eksperimentet er ferdig og prosjektet avsluttet, senest 31.12.2007, vil 
alle personlig opplysninger fra datamaterialet bli slettet. Vi ønsker imidlertid å oppbevare 
navnelisten manuelt slik at vi ved senere eksperimenter har mulighet til å unngå å bruke de 
samme deltagerne. Det vil ikke være mulig for noen, selv forskeren, å spore en beslutning 
tilbake til enkeltpersoner. Dine beslutninger i eksperimentet vil derfor være anonyme både 
ovenfor andre deltagere og forskeren. Resultatene vil bli presentert i vitenskapelige 
publikasjoner, og det presenteres på en slik måte at det på ingen måte er mulig å spore noe av 
datamaterialet tilbake til enkeltpersoner som deltok i eksperimentet. Alle opplysninger du 
oppgir i et eksperiment er konfidensielle, og vil ikke bli overlevert til andre.    
 
Prosjektet er meldt til Personvernombundet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig 
datatjeneste, AS.  
 
Samtykkeerklæring 
Jeg har mottatt skriftlig informasjon og er villig til å delta i eksperimentet. Deltagelse i 
eksperiment er frivillig og ved å registrere meg til eksperimentet, gir jeg mitt samtykke til å 
delta. Jeg er informert om at jeg når som helst kan trekke meg fra å delta i eksperiment uten å 
oppgi grunn, og at forskeren plikter å slette all informasjon om meg dersom jeg skriftlig ber 
om det. 
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A.2 Rules 
 
Regler 
 
 
 
Resultatet fra dette eksperimentet vil bli brukt i et 
forskningsprosjekt. Det er derfor veldig viktig at alle som 
deltar i eksperimentet følger visse regler. 
 
 Det er ikke tillatt å snakke med noen av de 
andre deltagerne under eksperimentet. 
 Hvis det er spørsmål eller du trenger hjelp. Rekk 
opp hånden så vil en av oss hjelpe dere. 
 Alle mobiltelefoner må være slått av. 
 Det er ikke lov å benytte andre programmer enn 
det som er allerede er startet for dere. 
 
De som ikke overholder disse reglene vil bli bedt om å forlate 
eksperimentet. 
 
 
 
 
 
Takk for din deltagelse! 
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A.3 Test session instructions 
 
Eksperiment i atferdsøkonomi 18.02.2009, instruksjoner: 
 
Velkommen og takk for at dere tar dere tid til å delta i dette eksperimentet i atferdsøkonomi. 
Som takk for oppmøtet vil dere motta kr 50,-. Betaling utover dette avhenger av dine valg 
gjennom eksperimentets gang. 
 
En kopi av disse instruksjonene ligger ved siden av datamaskinen du sitter ved. 
 
Resultatene fra dette eksperimentet skal brukes i en masteroppgave i samfunnsøkonomi og vil 
kunne legges til grunn for et eventuelt større forskningsprosjekt. For at resultatene skal kunne 
bli så riktige og individuelle som mulig er det viktig at dere følger noen få regler: 
 
 Ikke snakk eller på andre måter kommuniser med de andre deltakerne så lenge 
eksperimentet foregår eller diskuter eksperimentet med andre etter at det er 
gjennomført da det er flere grupper som skal delta etter dere. 
 Skru av mobiltelefonen. 
 Dersom du har spørsmål eller trenger hjelp med gjennomføringen av 
eksperimentet vennligst rekk opp hånden så vil en av oss komme bort til deg 
og hjelpe så godt vi kan. 
I starten av eksperimentet vil dere få oppgitt et ID-nummer og bli bedt om å skrive ned dette 
på det vedlagte arket. På dette arket ber vi dere også skrive ned navn, adresse, kontonummer 
og fødselsnummer slik at regnskapsavdelingen skal kunne overføre betalingen til dere. Denne 
informasjonen er det kun regnskapsavdelingen som vil få, og det er i tillegg til beløpet dere 
skal motta også den eneste informasjonen de får. Pass på å notere ID-nummeret korrekt da 
dette er det eneste som knytter dere til eksperimentet og beløpet dere vil motta. Gjennom hele 
eksperimentet dreier valgene dere tar seg om faktiske pengebeløp. 
 
Dette eksperimentet består av fire runder, og det vil være små variasjoner fra runde til runde 
som dere vil bli informert om når dere trenger det. Hver runde består av to deler. I del 1 blir 
dere delt inn i grupper på to og to personer som vil ha hver sin oppgave der målet er å dele kr 
100,-. Den ene i gruppen, tilbyderen, foreslår hvordan disse hundre kronene skal deles mellom 
dere to. Den andre, mottakeren, skal enten godta eller avslå tilbyderens forslag. Hvem av dere 
i gruppen som er tilbyder og hvem som er mottaker er helt tilfeldig, og vil variere i løpet av 
eksperimentet. Tilbyder kan foreslå å dele beløpet likt slik at dere får kr 50,- hver eller tilby kr 
20,- til mottakeren og kr 80,- til seg selv. Dette er tilbyderens to eneste alternativer. Dersom 
mottaker godtar fordelingen deles summen på den foreslåtte måten. Dersom mottaker avslår 
fordelingen vil ingen av de to motta noe fra forhandlingsdelen. 
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Eksempel: Det er kr 100,- som skal deles, og tilbyder tilbyr mottaker 
kr 50,-. Dersom mottaker godtar tilbudet får denne kr 50,- og tilbyder 
får kr 50,-. Dersom mottaker avslår tilbudet får begge spillere kr 0,-. 
 
Del 2 er en konkurranse mellom alle 12 deltakere i rommet. Dere skal her velge et heltall fra 
og med null til og med hundre. Deretter vil datamaskinen beregne gjennomsnittet av alle de 
12 tallene. Den personen som velger tallet som er nærmest en andel p (for eksempel en 
tredjedel) av gjennomsnittet vinner en premie på kr 500,-. Dersom flere har valgt samme tall, 
deles premien likt mellom dem. Andelen p vil variere fra runde til runde.  I hver runde vil 
dere få tre minutter på å velge et tall. Etter at alle har valgt et tall, vil hver og en av dere med 
en gang få vite om dere har vunnet eller ikke, og i tilfelle hvor mange som deler premien og 
hvor mye dere har vunnet hver. Ingen andre enn du selv får vite om du har vunnet eller ikke.  
 
Eksempel med tre deltakere og p = 3/4: Deltakerne velger tallene 50, 
34 og 12. Gjennomsnittet er (50+34+12)/3=32. Tre fjerdedeler av 
dette er 24. Vinneren er den deltakeren som valgte 34 siden dette er 
det av de tre tallene som er nærmest 24. 
 
Hver runde gjennomføres i tre omganger. Først gir tilbyderen sitt forslag til deling, deretter 
deltar alle i konkurransen før mottaker til slutt bestemmer seg for å godta tilbudet eller ikke. 
Dette er illustrert i tabellen under: 
 
Omgang 
1 
Tilbud (del 1) 
2 
Konkurranse (del 2) 
3 
Respons (del 1) 
Tilbyder Gi tilbud Velg et tall - 
Mottaker - Velg et tall Godta eller avslå tilbud 
 
Den av rundene som skal være gjeldende for bestemmelse av betaling for deltakelsen er blitt 
vilkårlig valgt på forhånd. I tillegg til betaling fra del 1 og 2 i den gjeldende runden vil 
tilbydere i gjeldende runde få kr 10,- hver og mottakere i gjeldende runde vil få kr 50,- hver, 
uavhengig av utfallet i de to delene. 
Eksperimentet gjennomføres anonymt, og all kommunikasjon mellom spillere skjer via et 
nettverksprogram. Dere vil ikke få vite hvem som er den andre deltakeren i del 1. Dere vil 
heller ikke bli bedt om personopplysninger under eksperimentets gang, og alle beslutninger 
som tas av deltakerne mens eksperimentet pågår kan kun observeres av deltakeren selv. 
Er det noen spørsmål til instruksjonene? 
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A.4 Control session instructions 
 
Eksperiment i atferdsøkonomi 18.02.2009, instruksjoner: 
 
Velkommen og takk for at dere tar dere tid til å delta i dette eksperimentet i atferdsøkonomi. 
Som takk for oppmøtet vil dere motta kr 50,-. Betaling utover dette avhenger av dine valg 
gjennom eksperimentets gang. 
 
En kopi av disse instruksjonene ligger ved siden av datamaskinen du sitter ved. 
Resultatene fra dette eksperimentet skal brukes i en masteroppgave i samfunnsøkonomi og vil 
kunne legges til grunn for et eventuelt større forskningsprosjekt. For at resultatene skal kunne 
bli så riktige og individuelle som mulig er det viktig at dere følger noen få regler: 
 
 Ikke snakk eller på andre måter kommuniser med de andre deltakerne så lenge 
eksperimentet foregår eller diskuter eksperimentet med andre etter at det er 
gjennomført da det er flere grupper som skal delta etter dere. 
 Skru av mobiltelefonen. 
 Dersom du har spørsmål eller trenger hjelp med gjennomføringen av 
eksperimentet vennligst rekk opp hånden så vil en av oss komme bort til deg 
og hjelpe så godt vi kan. 
I starten av eksperimentet vil dere få oppgitt et ID-nummer og bli bedt om å skrive ned dette 
på det vedlagte arket. På dette arket ber vi dere også skrive ned navn, adresse, kontonummer 
og fødselsnummer slik at regnskapsavdelingen skal kunne overføre betalingen til dere. Denne 
informasjonen er det kun regnskapsavdelingen som vil få, og det er i tillegg til beløpet dere 
skal motta også den eneste informasjonen de får. Pass på å notere ID-nummeret korrekt da 
dette er det eneste som knytter dere til eksperimentet og beløpet dere vil motta. Gjennom hele 
eksperimentet dreier valgene dere tar seg om faktiske pengebeløp. 
 
Dette eksperimentet består av fire runder, og det vil være små variasjoner fra runde til runde 
som dere vil bli informert om når dere trenger det. Hver runde består av to deler. I del 1 blir 
dere delt inn i grupper på to og to personer som vil ha hver sin oppgave der målet er å dele kr 
100,-. Den ene i gruppen, tilbyderen, foreslår hvordan disse hundre kronene skal deles mellom 
dere to. Den andre, mottakeren, skal enten godta eller avslå tilbyderens forslag. Hvem av dere 
i gruppen som er tilbyder og hvem som er mottaker er helt tilfeldig, og vil variere i løpet av 
eksperimentet. Tilbyder kan foreslå å dele beløpet likt slik at dere får kr 50,- hver eller tilby kr 
20,- til mottakeren og kr 80,- til seg selv. Dette er tilbyderens to eneste alternativer. Dersom 
mottaker godtar fordelingen deles summen på den foreslåtte måten. Dersom mottaker avslår 
fordelingen vil ingen av de to motta noe fra forhandlingsdelen. 
 
Eksempel: Det er kr 100,- som skal deles, og tilbyder tilbyr mottaker 
kr 50,-. Dersom mottaker godtar tilbudet får denne kr 50,- og tilbyder 
får kr 50,-. Dersom mottaker avslår tilbudet får begge spillere kr 0,-. 
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Del 2 er en konkurranse mellom alle 12 deltakere i rommet. Dere skal her velge et heltall fra 
og med null til og med hundre. Deretter vil datamaskinen beregne gjennomsnittet av alle de 
12 tallene. Den personen som velger tallet som er nærmest en andel p (for eksempel en 
tredjedel) av gjennomsnittet vinner en premie på kr 500,-. Dersom flere har valgt samme tall, 
deles premien likt mellom dem. Andelen p vil variere fra runde til runde.  I hver runde vil 
dere få tre minutter på å velge et tall. Etter at alle har valgt et tall, vil hver og en av dere med 
en gang få vite om dere har vunnet eller ikke, og i tilfelle hvor mange som deler premien og 
hvor mye dere har vunnet hver. Ingen andre enn du selv får vite om du har vunnet eller ikke.  
 
Eksempel med tre deltakere og p = 3/4: Deltakerne velger tallene 50, 
34 og 12. Gjennomsnittet er (50+34+12)/3=32. Tre fjerdedeler av 
dette er 24. Vinneren er den deltakeren som valgte 34 siden dette er 
det av de tre tallene som er nærmest 24. 
 
Den av rundene som skal være gjeldende for bestemmelse av betaling for deltakelsen er blitt 
vilkårlig valgt på forhånd. I tillegg til betaling fra del 1 og 2 i den gjeldende runden vil 
tilbydere i gjeldende runde få kr 10,- hver og mottakere i gjeldende runde vil få kr 50,- hver, 
uavhengig av utfallet i de to delene. 
 
Eksperimentet gjennomføres anonymt, og all kommunikasjon mellom spillere skjer via et 
nettverksprogram. Dere vil ikke få vite hvem som er den andre deltakeren i del 1. Dere vil 
heller ikke bli bedt om personopplysninger under eksperimentets gang, og alle beslutninger 
som tas av deltakerne mens eksperimentet pågår kan kun observeres av deltakeren selv. 
Er det noen spørsmål til instruksjonene? 
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A.5 Information sheets 
 
Runde 1: p = 2/3 
Her er noen spørsmål mens du tenker deg om: 
Dersom fire deltakere deltar i spillet med p=2/3 og de velger tallene 10, 20, 30 og 60, 
 Hva er gjennomsnittet? 
 Hva er vinnertallet? 
 Hvilke(t) tall er nærmest vinnertallet?  
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Runde 2: p = 1 
Her er noen spørsmål mens du tenker deg om: 
Dersom fire deltakere deltar i spillet med p=1 og de velger tallene 25, 35, 45 og 55, 
 Hva er gjennomsnittet? 
 Hva er vinnertallet? 
 Hvilke(t) tall er nærmest vinnertallet? 
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Runde 3: p = 1/2 
Her er noen spørsmål mens du tenker deg om: 
Dersom fire deltakere deltar i spillet med p=1/2 og de velger tallene 10, 25, 50 og 75, 
 Hva er gjennomsnittet? 
 Hva er vinnertallet? 
 Hvilke(t) tall er nærmest vinnertallet? 
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Runde 4: p = 2 
Her er noen spørsmål mens du tenker deg om: 
Dersom fire deltakere deltar i spillet med p=2 og de velger tallene 10, 20, 30 og 40, 
 Hva er gjennomsnittet? 
 Hva er vinnertallet? 
 Hvilke(t) tall er nærmest vinnertallet? 
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A.6 Payment form 
 
Utbetalingsskjema 
 
Sendes til:  
Gry Nystrøm 
Frischsenteret 
Gaustadalleen 21 
0349 Oslo 
 
Fyll inn: 
Navn  
Adresse  
Fødselsnummer (11 siffer)  
Kontonummer 
 
 
 
ID-nummer SB- 
 
 
Dette skjemaet må sendes til adressen ovenfor innen 14 dager. Adressert konvolutt er vedlagt. 
 
Tusen takk for din deltagelse på eksperimentet! 
 
 
Erklæring 
Jeg deltok på eksperiment ved OECONLAB ved Økonomisk Institutt, Universitetet i Oslo den 
27.03.2007.  
 
Signatur 
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A.7 Payment lists (randomized to ensure anonymity) 
 
Utbetaling eksperiment Oeconlab SB1, runde 4 
ID-nummer Total betaling  
SB-10xx 120  
SB-10xx 120  
SB-10xx 150  
SB-10xx 120  
SB-10xx 110  
SB-10xx 390  
SB-10xx 150  
SB-10xx 140  
SB-10xx 360  
SB-10xx 140  
SB-10xx 110  
SB-10xx 150  
Sum 2060  
   
   
Utbetaling eksperiment Oeconlab SB2, runde 3 
ID-nummer Total betaling  
SB-20xx 100  
SB-20xx 120  
SB-20xx 100  
SB-20xx 150  
SB-20xx 60  
SB-20xx 80  
SB-20xx 60  
SB-20xx 110  
SB-20xx 80  
SB-20xx 100  
SB-20xx 110  
SB-20xx 650  
SB-20xx 120  
SB-20xx 60  
Sum 1900  
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Appendix B. The treatments 
The following pages show the expanded trees as seen in the actual z-Tree work space from 
the two treatments in their final form. The first, (1:1, pp. 53-55) is the test treatment where the 
delay is introduced before the responder’s action is taken and the second (2:1, pp. 56-58) is 
the control treatment where the ultimatum game is finished before the delay. The problem of 
changing the share p between periods mentioned in section 4.2 was solved by introducing 
three additional parameters as seen under “Subjects do” close to the top. The command “p = if 
( Period == 1, 2/3, q )” reads: “If the treatment is in the first period, p equals 2/3. If not, p 
equals q.”  
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Appendix C. Figure: Results from the Keynesian 
Beauty Contest  
 
